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Five Myths About Antitrust Damages
By ROBERT H. LANDE*
A MYTH IS A STORY, TALE, OR LEGEND that has never been
proven. Myths are often related as if they were true and often are as-
sumed to be true-frequenfly by interested parties. But there is never
any solid evidence that they are true.
By analogy, there might be unicorns, dragons, or abominable
snowmen somewhere in the world. But until someone produces one,
we are justified to call each only a myth. Similarly, neither the Anti-
trust Modernization Commission ("AMC") nor anyone else should
make judicial or public policy decisions based upon myths, unless of
course someone presents solid evidence proving that the myths actu-
ally are true.
The principal myths of antitrust damages are:
Myth #1. Antitrust violations give rise to treble damages.
Myth #2. There is "duplication" of antitrust damages because
many defendants pay six-fold or more damages.
Myth #3. Courts should go easy on defendants when formulating
liability rules or calculating overcharges because the awarded damages
from a finding of an antitrust violation are so severe.
Myth #4. The size of the harms caused by antitrust violations,
even by such "hardcore" violations as naked cartels,1 is relatively mod-
* An earlier version of this Article appeared as The Four Myths About Antitrust
Damages: Hearing on Civil Remedies: Damages Multiplier, Attorneys'Fees, and Prejudgment Interest
Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (2005) (prepared statement of Robert H. Lande,
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Institute), available at http://www.amc.gov/commissionhearings/pdf/Lande.pdf (last
visited Feb. 9, 2006).
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1. "Price fixing is said to be 'naked' when it involves no more than an agreement to
restrict output or raise price ... ." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY. THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTiCE 146-47 (3d ed., Thomson/West 2005) (1994).
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est, and criminal penalties resulting from violations are out of propor-
tion to these harms. This causes overdeterrence.
Myth #5. Even though treble damages should be maintained for
"hardcore" violations, they should be reduced for some violations,
such as rule of reason 2 violations.
If I am correct in identifying these as myths, the AMC and other
decision-makers should not make recommendations or decisions to
reform the law building upon their purported truth.
I. Myth #1: Antitrust Violations Give Rise to Treble Damages
If you examine antitrust's so-called "treble" damages remedy care-
fully you will find that it really only amounts to approximately single
damages. In part this is true because prejudgment interest is not
awarded in antitrust cases. As Judge Easterbrook noted in Fishman v.
Estate of Wirtz,3
[T] he time value of money works in defendants' favor. Antitrust
cases can be long-lived affairs. This one has lasted 14 years, 2 1/2 of
which passed between the finding of liability and the award of dam-
ages. During all of the time, the defendants held the stakes and
earned interest.... To deny prejudgment interest is to allow the
defendants to profit from their wrong, and because 14 years is a
long time the profit may be substantial.
4
A survey by Judge Posner found that the average cartel probably
lasted for six to nine years, with an additional three to four year lag
before judgment.5 The failure of the antitrust laws to provide for pre-
judgment interest probably means that in cartel cases the so-called
"treble" damages are really only approximately double damages.6
2. The "rule of reason" is difficult to define accurately and completely. See id. at
253-68. Hovenkamp does, however, provide a succinct definition: "Under the rule of rea-
son, relevant facts are those that tend to establish whether a restraint increases or decreases
output, or decreases or increases prices." Id. at 255-56.
3. 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
4. Id at 583-84 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
5. Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365,
381 (1970). More recent studies yield similar results. See, e.g., JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL
PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE THE ENEMY 36 (2001) (estimating that, for example, the
vitamins cartel cases lasted an average of seven to eight years).
6. The precise value of this adjustment depends upon a number of factors. For ex-
ample, in 1993, I computed that this single factor alone probably would reduce the nomi-
nal treble damages multiplier down to a true multiplier between 1.25 and 1.66. See Robert
H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages? 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 134-36
(1993) [hereinafter Lande, "Treble" Damages] ($1.00 turns into between $1.81 and $2.40,
thus $3.00 $2.40 = 1.25, and $3.00 + $1.81 = 1.66) (some of the analysis in this Section is
based upon this article). Interest rates change considerably from year to year, however, and
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Moreover, antitrust violations give rise to allocative ineffi-
ciency 7-a loss that is never awarded in antitrust cases even though
allocative efficiency is at the center of most economic justifications for
having antitrust laws.8
How important is this omission? To oversimplify, Judge Easter-
brook made a number of standard assumptions and calculated that
the allocative inefficiency effects are probably, on average, around
half as large as the overcharges from market power.9 He concluded
that due to the omission from damage awards of this factor alone,
have been relatively low during the last decade. If this calculation were performed today, it
probably would yield a somewhat smaller adjustment.
However, recently the effect of the lack of prejudgment interest was calculated for the
vitamins cartel cases, in Brief for Certain Professors of Economics as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No.
03-724), 2004 WL 533930. These "Professors of Economics" calculated that the effective
payouts should have been multiplied by 2.25 to offset the lack of prejudgment interest. See
id. at *10 ($18 billion divided by $8 billion). In other words, due to this factor alone, in the
vitamins cases the nominal "treble". damages were really only approximately 1.33 times
single damages (3.0 divided by 2.25). This 1.33 result fits comfortably within the 1.25 to
1.66 range that I calculated in 1993.
7. Supracompetitive pricing causes a suboptimal use of societal resources:
To raise prices a monopoly reduces output from the competitive level. The goods
no longer sold are worth more to would-be purchasers than they would cost soci-
ety to produce. This foregone production of goods worth more than their cost is
pure social loss and constitutes the "allocative inefficiency" of monopoly. For ex-
ample, suppose that widgets cost $1.00 in a competitive market (their cost of pro-
duction plus a competitive profit). Suppose a monopolist would sell them for
$2.00. A potential purchaser who would have been willing to pay up to $1.50 will
not purchase at the $2.00 level. Since a competitive market would have sold them
widgets for less than they were worth to him, the monopolist's reduced produc-
tion has decreased the consumer's satisfaction without producing any counter-
vailing benefits for anyone. This pure loss is termed "allocative inefficiency."
Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 ATi-
TRUST BULL. 429, 433-34 n.17 (1988) [hereinafter Lande, The Rise]; see also EDWIN MANS-
FIELD, MICROECONOMIcs: THEORY AND APPUICATIONS 277-92 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 4th
ed. 1982) (1970).
8. See generally David C. Hjelmfelt & Channing D. Strother, Jr., Antitrust Damages for
Consumer Welfare Loss, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 505 (1991). I am unaware of either a more
recent article on the subject or any antitrust case where any plaintiff received damages for
the allocative inefficiency harms of market power.
9. In other words, Judge Easterbrook calculated that the allocative inefficiency ef-
fects were half as large as the transfer effects. See Frank Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust
Damages, 28J.L. & EcON. 445, 455 (1985). Other reasonable analysts believe that the ratio is
higher, or lower, than Judge Easterbrook's estimate. "Some thoughtful antitrust analysts
predict an average ratio lower than two to one, while others predict that the ratio will
usually be four to one or higher, at least under specified conditions." See Lande, "Treble"
Damages, supra note 6, at 152 (citations omitted), for sources. For example, if there is pre-
existing market power the relative size of the allocative inefficiency to the transfer will be
greater. See id. at 152-53.
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"' [t] reble damages' really are [only] double the starting point of over-
charge plus allocative loss . . .,,0
Both of these adjustments should be made to the nominal
"treble" damages remedy to determine its true size. Adjusting the so-
called "treble" damage awards for their failure to include allocative
inefficiency effects would reduce the effective damages multiplier
level from three down to two-but so would adjusting for the failure
to award prejudgment interest. What would happen if we were to
make both adjustments at once?
Before combining these two adjustments, however, one should
consider "umbrella effects"-another virtually unawarded damage
from market power."' For example, since 1970 the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") never produced even 60%
of the entire world's supply of petroleum and in most years produced
less than 50%.12 Yet, when OPEC used its market power to raise the
price of the petroleum that its members produced, prices also in-
creased for the petroleum sold by non-cartel members. 13 Moreover,
these higher oil prices also caused the price of natural gas, which is to
some extent a substitute for oil, to rise. Some estimates indicate that a
1% increase in oil prices would lead to increases in natural gas prices
of .75% to 1.2%.14 Natural gas is used approximately 57% as much as
10. See Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 455 (noting that for administrative simplicity it
would be necessary to make reasonable yet simplifying assumptions: "In the simple case of
linear demand and supply curves, the allocative loss is half the monopoly overcharge, so a
multiplier of 1.5 is in order. These curves doubtless are not linear, but legal rules must be
derived from empirical guesses rather than exhaustive investigation. The multiplier of 1.5
thus may be a rough approximation of the lower bound. It takes care of the fact that the
non-buyers do not recover damages. A further multiplier is necessary to handle the im-
probability of proving liability. As uncertainty and the difficulty of prosecution increase, so
should the multiplier. From the violator's perspective, "treble" damages really are double
the starting point of overcharge plus allocative loss, and thus trebling the overcharge is
appropriate when the chance of finding and successfully prosecuting a violation is one in
two.").
11. An "umbrella effect" arises when a cartel or monopoly affecting part of a relevant
market causes prices in the rest of the market to rise. See 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
384-85, 347 nn.3, 4 (2d. ed. 2000).
12. See ORG. OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES, OPEC ANNUAL STATISTICAL
BULLETIN (2004), http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%2OBulletin/pdf/
ASB2004.pdf 22 (last visited Oct. 30, 2005). The highest percentage was 55.4% in 1973,
and the lowest percentage was 28.5% in 1985. Id The most recent figure, for 2004, was
41.9%. Id
13. See 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, at 384-86.
14. See, e.g., Stephen P.A. Brown, Natural Gas Pricing: Do Oil Prices Still Matter?, SOUTH-
WEST ECON., July/August 2005, at 9, 10, available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/
swe/2005/swe0504c.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2006); Mine K. Yucel & Shengyi Guo, Fuel
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petroleum in the United States. 15 If a 1% rise in OPEC members' pe-
troleum prices caused the price of non-OPEC oil to rise by 1%, and
the price of natural gas to rise by even .75%, then a $1.00 increase in
the price of petroleum by OPEC would increase the price of oil and
natural gas by an additional combined amount of $1.86.16 Adjusting
the nominal "treble" damages multiplier only for these unawarded
umbrella effects of market power (i.e., 3.00/2.86 = 1.05) would mean
that the so-called "treble" damages were actually only 1.05 times the
actual damages. 17
The umbrella effects caused by OPEC's exercise of market power
surely are significantly larger than the average umbrella effect due to
the tight supply of, and inelastic demand for, petroleum products. A
more realistic estimate might only assume umbrella effects equal in
size to the average market share of the fringe firms in monopolization
cases, from 10% to 30%.18
Moreover, there are five more adjustments19 to the so-called
"treble" damages multiplier that also should be considered when de-
Taxes and Cointegration of Energy Prices, CoNTEMP. ECON. POL'Y, July, 1994, at 33, 33-41.
Relationships between oil prices and those of other fuels (e.g., coal and uranium) are
more difficult to establish. While it might often be practical to take the wealth transfers
from consumers to producers in these closely related markets into account when figuring
the true amount of harm from OPEC, it might be more difficult to consider the additional
allocative inefficiency arising from distortions in these markets.
15. The 2004 United States energy use percentage estimates were: petroleum 39.8%;
natural gas 23.0%; and coal 22.5%. See DEPT. OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. PRI-
MARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY SOURCE AND SECrOR, 2004 (2004), available at http://www.
eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pecss.diagram.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). Another estimate
for 2004 reported energy demand in the United States is: coal 22.5%, natural gas 22.6%,
petroleum 40.8%, nuclear 8.3%, and other 5.9%. E-mail from Dr. Diana Moss, Vice Presi-
dent & Senior Fellow, American Antitrust Institute, to Robert H. Lande, Director, Ameri-
can Antitrust Institute (Nov. 20, 2005) (on file with Author) (referencing Press Release,
Dep't of Energy, Energy Info. Admin., Short-Term Energy Outlook Table A3 (Nov. 8,
2005), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/forecasting/steo/oldsteos/nov5.pdf.).
The average of these estimates is 40.28% for petroleum and 22.795% for natural gas.
This means that in the United States natural gas is used approximately 22.795%/40.28% =
57% as much as petroleum.
16. This increase would include an increase of $1.00 on the non-OPEC petroleum
(assuming that OPEC has a 50% share of the petroleum market). It also would include an
increase of .75 x .57 x $2.00 (the size of the petroleum increase) = .86 for the natural gas
price increase. This would total an increase of $1.86 due to the umbrella effects.
17. Interestingly, the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines appear to esti-
mate that the effects of the lack of prejudgment interest, umbrella effects, and allocative
inefficiency effects together are equal to the transfer effects. See infta text accompanying
note 61.
18. See Lande, "Treble" Damages, supra note 6, at 151.
19. The omitted five factors are: (1) the effects of the Statute of Limitations, (2) the
uncompensated plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs, (3) the uncompensated value of plain-
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termining the true "net harms to others"20 from an antitrust violation
(the "net harms to others" benchmark comes from the standard opti-
mal deterrence model).21 If we make all eight of the appropriate ad-
justments, awarded antitrust damages are probably only really equal
to, at most, the actual harms caused by the violation. 22 Antitrust's
"treble" damages are actually only single damages.
However, standard optimal deterrence theory says that the multi-
plier should be larger than one because not all antitrust violations are
detected and proven. 23 If awarded damages are not greater than one,
potential violators would have an incentive to engage in anticompeti-
tive conduct. As observed by Judge Easterbrook,
Multiplication is essential to create optimal incentives for would-be
violators when unlawful acts are not certain to be prosecuted suc-
cessfully. Indeed, some multiplication is necessary even when most
of the liability-creating acts are open and notorious. The defend-
ants may be able to conceal facts that are essential to liability.2 4
It is sometimes assumed, for example, that only one-third of all
cartels are detected and proven.25 If this is true, then a true multiplier
tiffs' time spent pursuing the case, (4) the costs of the judicial system, and (5) the tax
effects. See id. at 136-54.
20. Damages from an antitrust violation should consist of the "net harm to persons
other than the offender," multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of detection and
proof. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652,
656 (1983). For a discussion, see Lande, "Treble" Damages, supra note 6, at 124-29.
21. In addition, antitrust violations can lead to less short term consumer choice and
lower long term rates of innovation. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Implementing the
"Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law, 73 ANTrrRUsT L.J. (forthcoming 2006). These
can at times be more important to consumer welfare than the price effects of anticompeti-
tive behavior. Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PiTr.
L. REv. 503, 508-11, 514-17 (2001). I have not tried to adjust the "treble" damages multi-
plier for its failure to take account of diminutions in short term consumer choice or inno-
vation caused by antitrust violations.
22. In 1993 I calculated that from an optimal deterrence perspective, antitrust's
"treble" damages probably only amounted to between .68 and 1.09 times actual damages.
Lande, "Treble" Damages, supra note 6, at 159-60. These results should be approached with
caution, however. They are not so precise that we fairly can conclude with certainty that
the "true" effective antitrust damage multiplier is either .68 or 1.09 times the actual dam-
ages. This range is just an estimate. But it surely is safe to conclude that the true figure is
much closer to single damages than to treble damages. Moreover, it is likely that the true
level is even less than single damages.
23. See Landes, supra note 20, at 656-57. The Landes article builds upon and applies
to antitrust a framework developed in Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Landes, supra note 20, at 652.
24. Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 454.
25. I am not aware of any current reliable evidence as to what percentage of antitrust
violations is detected. The best evidence of which I am aware is the 1986 estimate made by
Douglas Ginsburg. Ginsburg testified that the enforcers catch less than 10% of all cartels.
See Public Hearing on Sentencing Options: Hearing Before United States Sentencing Comm'n 15
[Vol. 40
of three is appropriate. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that
this multiplier is separate from the prejudgment interest adjustment
and other points made earlier.26 The central point, moreover, is that
the current multiplier is only one at most. It is a myth that antitrust
violations give rise to treble damages.
II. Myth #2: There Is "Duplication" of Antitrust Damages
Because Many Defendants Pay Six-fold or More
Damages
There have been a number of variations of the argument that the
combination of "treble" damages for direct purchasers, plus another
"three" for indirect purchasers, plus disgorgement, plus fines of two-
fold damages, can lead to six-fold, eight-fold, or more overall damages
paid by a cartel or monopoly. 27 As Donald Klawiter, Chair of the
American Bar Association ("ABA") Antitrust Section, recently warned,
"[Indirect purchasers] will be an issue in virtually all treble damage
suits going forward .... The question is: Can a court sort out all the
damages and get it right so [defendants] are not paying six times
damages?" 28
(1986) (statement of Douglas Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Antitrust) (unpub-
lished public hearing on file with Author). If Ginsburg is correct, then due to this factor
alone, ten-fold damages are appropriate, not treble damages.
However, the percentage of cartels that are caught and proven probably is significantly
higher today due to the Department of Justice amnesty program. See Gary R. Spratling,
Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting Violations 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
798, 817-23 (2001). There is, however, no evidence that currently more than one cartel in
three is detected.
26. Judge Easterbrook noted:
Is this [lack of prejudgment interest] small beer, to be made up by the trebling of
the damages? Hardly. Any erosion of the trebling on account of a denial of inter-
est undermines the deterrent force of the antitrust law. Trebling makes up for the
fact that antitrust violations are hard to detect and prove.... The expected dam-
ages are the deterrent. Today's decision reduces that deterrent .... The denial of
prejudgment interest systematically undercompensates victims and underdeters
putative offenders. We should allow, indeed require, such awards.
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 584 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., Michael L. Denger, A New Approach to Cartel Enforcement Remedies Is Needed,
2002 ABA SPRING ANTITRUST MEETING 15 (meeting held Apr. 24-26, 2002). Some of the
analysis in this section is based upon Robert H. Lande, Why Antitrust Damage Levels Should
Be Raised, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 329, 341-43 (2004) [hereinafter Lande, Damage
Levels].
28. Pamela A. MacLean, Antitrust Dilemma Emerges in U.S. Courts: Price-Fixing Actions
flood in from States, NAT'L L.J. Sept. 19, 2005, at 1, 1; see also A.B.A. SEcrrIoN OF ANTITRUST
LAw: REPORT ON REMEDIES 3 (2005), in State Indirect Purchaser Actions: Proposals for Reform:
Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/
commission hearings/pdf/Steuer.pdf (prepared remarks of Richard M. Steuer) (One of
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The "duplication" or "duplicative recovery" specter, however, is
only a theoretical possibility that has never occurred in the real world.
There has never been even one case where a cartel's 29 total payouts
exceeded three times the damages involved.3 0 Moreover, a close read-
ing of the critics reveals that they indicate that duplication "could"
happen 3 -without ever showing that it "has" happened.3 2 Illinois
Brick v. Illinois,33 which held that indirect purchasers cannot recover
damages under the federal antitrust laws, is more than twenty-eight
years old, and California v. ARC America Corp.,3 4 where the Supreme
Court held that Illinois Brick did not preempt state laws permitting in-
direct purchasers to recover, is more than sixteen years old.3 5 But de-
fendants' nightmare scenario of six-fold or eight-fold payouts has
never happened.
the "key features" of their proposal is that "[t] here would be no duplicative recovery under
the new cause of action. By consolidating direct and indirect claims in one forum, where
both direct and indirect claimants would have an opportunity to prove their respective
damages, the proposed statute would eliminate the possibility of duplicative recovery.").
Since there has never been duplicative recovery, this is not much of a benefit.
29. Similarly, I do not know of any monopolist that paid six-fold or more damages.
There might, however, be cases where individual members of a cartel paid six or more
times the damages attributable to its market share. Every member of a cartel is legally
responsible for all of the damages caused by the cartel (a logical rule since each member
should be responsible for helping to cause the entirety of a cartel's supracompetitive
prices). If one member of a cartel had to pay most or all of the damages caused by the
cartel, this easily could total much more than the damages attributable to that firm's sales.
It would only, of course, total three times the total damages caused by the cartel. Since the
paying firm helped cause all of the damages inflicted by the cartel, however, it would be
incorrect to conclude that it paid more than three times the damages that it caused.
30. I cannot prove that something does not exist. But I have looked quite hard and
have never found even one example of true duplication for a cartel, as judged by one or
more courts. Nor has any critic of the current system ever pointed out such an example.
Sooner or later an example may arise. If this happens my conclusion will be proven wrong.
But until this happens I stand by my conclusion. There is "duplicative" litigation in the
sense that the same defendants often are sued by both direct and indirect purchasers.
Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutors and the Coming of International Law, 68 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 711, 713-14 (2001). But there has never been a case of six-fold recovery against
a cartel.
31. See, e.g., Indirect Purchasers Actions: Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n
6-8 (2005), (statement of Michael L. Denger), available at http://www.amc.gov/commis-
sion.hearings/pdf/Denger.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Denger
Statement].
32. Id.; see also Indirect Purchasers Actions: Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization
Comm'n 5-6 (2005) (statements of presenters other than Michael L. Denger). If even one
such example existed surely one of the learned witnesses on these two panels would have
discussed it.
33. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
34. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
35. Id. at 105-06.
[Vol. 40
Spring 2006] AMC SYMPOSIUM 659
I challenge critics of the current system to present a real world
example of the mythical six-fold or eight-fold damages. Respectfully,
policymakers should only rely upon the conclusions of neutral third
parties such as judges or juries, rather than accepting defendants' as-
sertions concerning this issue.3 6 After all, defense lawyers typically
claim that their clients never raised prices at all.3 7 If this were true,
36. Mr. Denger, one of the nation's leading defense attorneys, who represented de-
fendants in the vitamins cartels cases, testified that "it is not unlikely that the defendants
paid fines, settlements and litigation expenses from U.S. criminal and civil litigation which,
in the aggregate, averaged over 100% of their U.S. sales." Denger Statement, supra note 31,
at 7 (footnote omitted).
It is difficult to critically evaluate Mr. Denger's assertion, however, because these cases
involved separate cartels for a number of different vitamins, which lasted for different peri-
ods of time. One would have to compare Mr. Denger's assessments of particular products,
time periods, and overcharges with those of the plaintiffs in these cases. This would be a
particularly difficult task because, with only one exception, no court has ever ruled on
these issues. We would have to compare potentially contradictory plaintiffs' and defend-
ants' allegations-not the most satisfactory method of proceeding. Moreover, United
States sales would not be a relevant measure of damages caused by a company's antitrust
violations since the focus must be on damages to all of its victims rather than just on the
United States sales of the victimizer.
Further, Mr. Denger did not adjust his calculations for antitrust's lack of prejudgment
interest. This factor alone would reduce Mr. Denger's 100% figure down to approximately
44%. See supra note 6 for the calculations showing the effect of the lack of prejudgment
interest on payouts in the vitamins cartel. In other words, if Mr. Denger had added pre-
judgment interest to the overcharge figures in his calculations, he would have found that
the cartel paid 44% of its United States sales, not 100%.
Interestingly, a 44% payment equals slightly less than the 61% damages that the jury
calculated in the only vitamins cartel case overcharge calculated by a neutral third party. In
reVitamins Antitrust Litig., Animal Sci. Prods. v. Chinook Group, Misc. No. 99-197 (TFH),
2003 WL 22114272 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2003) (choline chloride cartel jury verdict).
Moreover, recently Prof. John Connor conducted a comprehensive examination of
the sixteen global vitamins cartels and their related antitrust cases. John M. Connor, The
Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and Deterrence 1 (American Antitrust Institute,
Working Paper No. 06-02, 2006), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/
485.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006). Prof. Connor concluded: "There is little question that
the convicted members of the vitamins cartels were in absolute monetary terms the most
heavily sanctioned defendants in the history of antitrust law. Yet, it is equally non-contro-
vertible that the impressive corporate monetary sanctions imposed worldwide were inade-
quate to deter recidivism." Id. at 1. Specifically, Dr. Connor found that the total payments
by cartel members to all governments and plaintiffs, combined, were only 67% of its global
overcharges if nominal dollars are used, and only 34% of their overcharges if constant
dollars are used-well below single damages. Id. at 80.
Thus, the vitamins cases clearly do not qualify as an example of "duplication" or exces-
sive payouts by defendants.
37. See, e.g., Trial Transcript Oral Argument at 243, In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.,
Misc. 99-197, (D.D.C. May 29, 2003) (opening statement given by Kurt Odenwald, repre-
senting DuCoa, during morning session).
Equally as important, I think the evidence is going to show that the efforts by
those who did meet for the purpose of reaching an agreement to restrict prices or
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even a $1 settlement would constitute an infinite percentage of actual
damages. Plaintiffs, naturally, disagree sharply. Policymakers, how-
ever, should insist upon seeing objective findings by neutral third par-
ties such as judges or juries.
I have issued this challenge to many defense lawyers privately,
while making public speeches to legal audiences, and in writing 38 on
many occasions. No defense lawyer, however, has ever been able to
name a real case involving an actual duplicative damage recovery
against a cartel or monopoly. No case involving the payment of six-
fold damages by a cartel or a monopoly has ever been unearthed.
Moreover, from a public policy perspective, anyone wanting to change
the current damages system should have to present not just an iso-
lated example, but a pattern of such evidence that might justify dam-
ages reform.
Instead, the following scenario is more typical: Assuming plain-
tiffs can get the class certified-which is no easy task-39-defense attor-
neys negotiate a settlement with direct purchasers of nominal single
damages.40 This settlement is followed by a settlement with indirect
purchasers (from many of the twenty-five or more states that permit
to allocate markets simply did not succeed. The conspiracy, as it is alleged with
regard to pricing, never really came together. It never really came together.
Id.
38. See Lande, Damage Levels, supra note 27, at 341-43.
39. Class certification plays a central role in most antitrust damages suits.
The reality is that little or no effective private prosecution of antitrust cases will
occur in most cases if a class isn't certified-and the risk is real that a class will not
be certified, even in horizontal price-fixing cases. Moreover, even if a class of
direct purchasers is certified, there is a good chance that one or more indirect
purchaser classes will not be certified. That possibility has little to do with the
merits and yet it provides a strong reason for potential wrongdoers to take a
chance on violating the law. From the perspective of a litigator, this is one of the
key reasons that treble damages are insufficient to deter antitrust violations.
E-mail from Josh Davis, Professor of Law, Univ. of S.F. Sch. of Law, to Robert Lande, Pro-
fessor of Law, Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of Law (Oct. 10, 2005) (on file with Author).
40. Several plaintiffs' lawyers have told me that settlements with direct purchasers as
high as single damages are rare. This is in part because both sides know that juries are
reluctant to award significant damages to direct purchasers because juries often believe-
perhaps correctly-that the direct purchasers, which can pass on most or all of the over-
charge to their customers, were not really hurt. Juries are thought to reason that direct
purchasers might have been hurt only slightly or not at all, so despite the judge's instruc-
tions, they compute damages on the low side. In addition, often some victims are excluded
from the class for one reason or another-including that their damages are too difficult to
compute on a classwide basis. This is another reason why the overall settlement often is less
than all of the damages caused by the cartel.
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these suits4 1 ) that aggregate to no more than one-half of nominal
damages. 42 To this amount should be added the criminal fine, which
often is negotiated down to one or one and one-half times the sup-
posed damages. Together, this would appear to total roughly nominal
treble damages for the cartel: 1 + 1/2 + (1 to 1.5) = approximately 3.
After appropriate adjustments are made for lack of prejudgment
interest and the other factors noted earlier, however, the effective to-
tal is likely to be only approximately single damages-certainly not six-
fold damages. The "duplicative recovery" or "overdeterrence" argu-
ment is mythical, and should be ignored.
Finally, the "duplicative recovery" argument distracts the debate
from what should be its primary focus-the optimal deterrence of an-
titrust violations.43 Those who believe that improved economic effi-
ciency is the only legitimate goal of antitrust law and that deterrence
(not compensation) is the only appropriate role for antitrust dam-
ages, almost unanimously believe that the appropriate measure of
damages is the net harm to others caused by the violations multiplied
by the probability of detection and proof.44 From a deterrence per-
41. See Daniel R. Karon, Your Honor, Tear Down That Illinois Brick Wall! The National
Movement Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 1351, 1401 (2004).
42. These estimates might well be high, as I have not seen any solid figures. A fortiori,
as Prof. Cavanaugh notes: "I suspect that settlements providing for treble actual damages
are rare, if not virtually non-existent." See Civil Remedies Issues: Hearing Before the Antitrust
Modernization Comm'n 11 (2005) (Statement of Edward D. Cavanaugh), available at http://
www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/Cavanagh.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) [here-
inafter Cavanaugh Statement].
43. For an insightful discussion of this issue, see Jonathan B. Baker, New Horizons in
Cartel Detection, 69 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824 (2001). This Article will not discuss whether the
antitrust laws also should compensate consumers injured by antitrust violations.
44. See Landes, supra note 20, at 656; see also WiuLiAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA,
AN-nRusT PENALTY REFORM 12 (1986). Professors Breit and Elzinga have provided the
clearest explanation of the "net harm to others" standard:
The trick to discovering the optimal sanction is to find a rule that will force the
potential cartelist to compare any cost saving from his activity with the deadweight
loss triangle. If the cost saving were larger than the deadweight loss, it would be in
his (and society's) interest to undertake the illegal activity. So after he deducts the
monopoly profit rectangle... the cartelist will examine the deadweight loss (the
remainder of the fine to be paid) and compare it with the value of the cost saving.
The fine that is the sum of the deadweight triangle plus the profit rectangle is the
correct sanction since it will encourage the "right" amount of illegal antitrust ac-
tivity. Damages larger than this ... could lead to overdeterrence ....
A numerical example may help to clarify the concept of the optimal antitrust
sanction. Assume that a potential cartelist calculates that joining a horizontal
price-fixing conspiracy will increase his profits by $100 million. He also is aware
that the deadweight loss imposed on society by his activity is $50 million. If the
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spective it does not matter precisely who gets the recovery;45 the focus
should be on making sure that someone forces the defendants to pay
an optimal amount of damages. It is true that often there are mis-
matches between those plaintiffs who recover antitrust damages and
those who were harmed by antitrust violations. 46 The antitrust field's
focus, however, should be on the fact that the total payouts from anti-
trust violations are not nearly large enough to deter antitrust viola-
tions optimally. Thus, the debate should be over the best ways to
increase this total. 47 The duplication argument should not distract
from the fact that, overall, the awarded antitrust damages are only a
fraction as large as they should be to ensure optimal deterrence, and
that they should be increased significantly.48
expected value of the fine imposed is the entire amount of consumers' surplus
($150 million) would he enter the cartel? He would do so if he believed that the
cartel would be accompanied by cost reductions to him greater than $50 million.
If the cost saving were, say, $60 million, he would still enter the price-fixing con-
spiracy because he would know that his fine would be $100 million (his cartel
profits) plus $50 million (the deadweight loss), leaving him $10 million more
revenue than would be the case if he did not enter the cartel. In this case the
cartel is accompanied by cost reductions greater than the deadweight loss it im-
poses on society. On efficiency grounds, it should be permitted.
Id. at 11-12.
45. From a deterrence perspective it does not matter whether direct purchasers or
indirect purchasers recover the overcharges. It would be scandalous if defendants were
permitted to keep their overcharges due to excessive concern about whether these
overcharges should be given to the direct purchasers instead of to the indirect purchasers.
46. This mismatch can arise because in some cases only direct purchasers will be al-
lowed to recover while indirect purchasers absorb most of the overcharges. The mismatch
also can be due to the umbrella effects and other points made earlier in this Article.
47. The approach advocated by Landes, Breit, Elzinga, and others, supra note 44 and
accompanying text, does not attempt to deter all antitrust violations. It only attempts to
deter an optimal amount of antitrust violations, whenever so doing would likely be
efficient.
48. Moreover, it is a myth that awarded antitrust damages "overcompensate" plaintiffs.
Those injured plaintiffs who recover in private damages suits are not overcompensated.
Even in those rare cases where consumer plaintiffs receive nominal "treble" damages, they
are only probably compensated between .63 and 1.10 times their losses from price fixing
due to the lack of prejudgment interest issue, statute of limitations problems, and other
necessary adjustments. See Lande, "Treble" Damages, supra note 6, at 162, for the appropri-
ate calculations.
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m. Myth #3: Courts Should Go Easy on Defendants when
Formulating Liability Rules or Calculating Overcharges
Because the Awarded Damages from a Finding of an
Antitrust Violation Are So Severe
Respected scholars persuasively argue that the very existence of
the so-called "treble" damages remedy systematically biases the results
of antitrust litigation in defendants' favor because judges regard the
remedy as excessive. 49 No matter that the statute awards "treble" dam-
ages for antitrust violations, judges can find numerous ways to avoid
awarding them.50 These scholars assert that the automatic nature of
the "treble" damages multiplier might cause some judges to favor de-
fendants when they formulate substantive antitrust rules, when they
measure ambiguous factual situations against these rules, or when
they devise appropriate standing rules.51 Some courts might be reluc-
49. See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1140 (1986) [hereinafter
Calkins, Summary Judgment].
This issue was posed at the July 28, 2005 AMC Hearing:
[E]ven though the courts, by and large, deny this, there is undoubtedly a differ-
ent standard in antitrust cases in a number of respects. There is a tougher sum-
mary judgment rule for plaintiffs. There's much tougher judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, from a plaintiffs perspective, much tougher Rule 12
standards for plaintiffs. There is a very rigorous set of standards in antitrust injury
doctrine that in the Sixth Circuit probably means that no plaintiff should be al-
lowed to sue at all.
The question is the one that our advisor, Bill Kovacic, has, and to me it is the
one troubling question about treble damages, which is, do we have these sort of
out-of-sorts doctrines in antitrust, these pro-defendant doctrines, as a reaction to
treble damages? And if so, should we do something about it?
Civil Remedies Issues: Hearings Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n 66 (2005) (comments
by Comm'r Jonathan Jacobson), available at http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/
pdf/Transcript050728.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
As (then Professor and now FTC Commissioner) William E. Kovacic observed,
[A] court might fear that the US statutory requirement that successful private
plaintiffs receive treble damages runs a risk of over-deterrence. A court might
seek to correct such perceived infirmities in the anti-trust system by recourse to
means directly within its control-namely by modifying doctrine governing liabil-
ity standards or by devising special doctrinal tests to evaluate the worthiness of
private claims.
See William E. Kovacic, Private Participation in the Enforcement of Public Competition Laws, in 2
CuRurEN COMPETITION LAw 167, 173-74 (Mads Andenas et al. eds., 2004).
50. This also could apply to juries, but it is unclear how often juries are aware that
antitrust awards are trebled.
51. See Stephen Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, with Special Atten-
tion to Summay Judgment and to Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION 185
(Lawrence J. White ed., 1988) (citing other sources, particularly the reference to a similar
analysis by Areeda and Turner, id. at 191). Professor Calkins discusses how the law of mo-
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tant to "trebly" penalize defendants or "over-reward" plaintiffs unless
the activity at issue was truly outrageous. 52 Similarly, in otherwise close
cases judges might under-award damages or resolve ambiguities in de-
fendants' favor when they compute damages because they "know" that
the resulting award will be trebled. 53 For this reason the automatic
trebling feature, designed to encourage plaintiffs to bring suit and to
discourage defendants from engaging in anticompetitive behavior,
might create the opposite effect.
The irony, of course, is that these judges have been acting upon a
false foundation. Myth #1 showed that antitrust's nominal "treble"
damages are at most single damages. Antitrust damages levels are in
fact significantly lower than they should be for optimal deterrence.
Any systematic bias in defendants' favor by judges is perverse.
To the extent that the courts have systematically been biased re-
garding rules, practices, procedures, and precedents against plain-
tiffs, 5 4 these rules, practices, procedures, and precedents now should
nopolization, horizontal restraints, and vertical restraints might have developed more nar-
rowly because of the effects of damages awards that the courts believed to be treble. Id. at
191-95. He concludes that "class actions probably would be more easily certified were
there no trebling." Id. at 197. Professor Calkins also marshals support by demonstrating
why "it seems probable that trebling is a factor" in causing courts to "scrutinize[ ] damage
claims more rigorously than they once did." Id. at 198. "Plaintiffs would find standing rules
more hospitable in a single-damages world." Id.; see also Calkins, Summary Judgment, supra
note 49, at 1101; Homer Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in
Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MICH. L. REv. 363, 363 (1954) (concluding that "the mandatory
trebling of any recovery has generated a natural reluctance in the courts to impose prodig-
ious damages upon violators of the act .... ."); John F. Hart, Standing Doctrine in Antitrust
Damage Suits, 1890-1975: Statutory Exegesis, Innovation, and the Influence of Doctrinal History,
59 TENN. L. REv. 191, 241-42 (1992).
52. Joseph L. McEntee,Jr. & Robert C. Kahrl, Damages Caused by the Acquisition and Use
of Monopoly Power, 49 ANTITRtUST L.J. 165, 167-68 (1980) ("[A]n award of treble damages
for violating section 2's proscription of 'monopolization' in some cases might appear to be
unpredictable, capricious and, thus, unfair [because] ... the line between permissible and
impermissible conduct for a monopolist is too imprecise and unpredictable a basis on
which to impose punitive damages.").
53. See Calkins, Summary Judgment, supra note 49, at 1104; see also Note, ControllingJury
Damage Awards in Private Antitrust Suits, 81 MICH. L. REv. 693, 694-98 (1983).
54. Kovacic concluded: "I believe the hypothesis helps explain the modem evolution
of antirust doctrine in the United States." Kovacic, supra note 49, at 175.
My intuition is that courts reacted to the private cases [against IBM] with appre-
hension and were ill at ease with the possibility that a finding of illegal monopoli-
zation would trigger the imposition of massive damage awards against IBM. The
courts in these matters could not refuse to treble damages if they found liability,
but they could interpret the law in ways that resulted in a finding of no liability.
Id. at 176.
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all be revised in plaintiffs' favor to achieve neutrality. 55 Substantive
antitrust rules, class certification rules, and the methodology by which
damages are calculated should all be revisited in light of these
considerations. 56
It is possible that this unfortunate outcome arose from percep-
tion or articulation problems. Perhaps scholars, policymakers, and
plaintiffs' attorneys have been remiss for failing to explain clearly that,
when viewed correctly, the current so-called antitrust "treble" damages
actually are only single damages. Maybe these people have been re-
miss in failing to explain that the duplication/duplicative recovery/
overdeterrence argument is only a myth. Perhaps they should be
faulted for failing to counter defendants' misinformation concerning
these issues. Maybe they simply have not done a satisfactory job ex-
plaining why the current levels of antitrust damages should be in-
creased. Unfortunately, those primarily suffering from these failures
and misperceptions are the victims of antitrust violations.
IV. Myth #4: The Size of the Harms Caused by Antitrust
Violations, Even by Such Hardcore Violations as Naked
Cartels, Is Relatively Modest, and Criminal Penalties
Resulting from Violations Are Out of Proportion to
These Harms. This Causes Overdeterrence.
Some suggest that the average size of the antitrust injury, even
from hardcore collusion, is modest.5 7 They assert, in effect, that many
or most cartels are established out of misguided optimism by naive
businesspeople, but collapse so quickly that their harm to the econ-
55. Antitrust rules should be neutral, rather than s'.-tematically favor plaintiffs or
defendants.
56. Kovacic explained that where courts
fear that the remedial scheme (e.g., mandatory treble damages for all offenses)
deters legitimate business conduct excessively, the courts will use measures within
their control to correct the perceived imbalance. The courts will "equilibrate" the
antitrust system in one of three ways[. Judges will]: .. .construct doctrinal tests
under the rubric of "standing" or "injury" that make it harder for the private party
to pursue its case; or ... adjust evidentiary requirements that must be satisfied to
prove violations; or ... alter substantive liability rules in ways that make it more
difficult for the plaintiff to establish the defendant's liability.
Kovacic, supra note 49, at 175.
57. See generally John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices?:
Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REv. 513, 527-29 (2005) (Some of the analy-
sis in this Section is based upon this article.) [hereinafter Connor & Lande, Optimal Cartel
Fines].
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omy usually is ephemeral. 58 If policymakers believe this, then when
they design the optimal antitrust remedy system, they should err on
the side of laxity because the harms from violations-even cartels-
are relatively small, while overdeterrence becomes a relatively greater
concern.
5 9
The cartel penalties imposed by the United States Sentencing
Commission ("U.S. Sent. Comm'n") are based upon a presumption
made by the Reagan Administration 60 that cartels raise prices by an
average of 10%.61 This figure has been attacked repeatedly as being
too high,62 or as being without empirical support.63
58. Of course, if the 10% estimate discussed in Myth #4 is accurate, it would not con-
stitute a "low" overcharge.
59. As Professor Kovacic noted: "A person who takes two aspirin will cure a headache;
a person who swallows the entire bottle will die." Kovacic, supra note 49, at 167.
60. The Reagan Administration's Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Douglas
Ginsburg, formulated and promulgated this estimate. In a statement to the U.S. Sent.
Comm'n, Ginsburg explained that the standard optimal deterrence model means that "the
optimal [f]ine for any given act [of price-fixing] is equal to the damage caused by the
violation divided by the probability of conviction[;] ... such a fine would result in the
socially optimal level of price fixing, which is in this case zero." Public Hearing on Sentencing
Options: Hearing Before the United States Sentencing Comm'n 13-14 (1986) (statement of Doug-
las Ginsburg) (unpublished public hearing). He also stated his judgment that "price fixing
typically results in price increases [ ] that has harmed the consumers in a range of 10
percent of the price." Id. at 15. The U.S. Sent. Comm'n then adopted the 10% presump-
tion. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Rl.1 cmt. (2004) (Bid-Rigging, Price Fixing
or Market-Allocation Agreements Among Competitors).
61. "It is estimated that the average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent of the selling
price." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1 cmt. n.3 (2004) (Bid-Rigging, Price
Fixing or Market-Allocation Agreements Among Competitors). The Guideline's commen-
tary adds:
The loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain because, among other things, injury is
inflicted upon consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the
product at the higher prices. Because the loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain,
subsection (d) (1) provides that 20 percent of the volume of affected commerce is
to be used in lieu of the pecuniary loss under § 8C2.4 (a) (3).
Id.
Thus, the Guidelines appear to double the 10% presumption to account for allocative
inefficiency effects of market power (and perhaps also to compensate for umbrella effects
and the lack of prejudgment interest)-not because they think that cartels raise prices on
the average by 20%.
62. The U.S. Sent. Comm'n's 10% presumption was quickly attacked as unreliable
and excessive. Cohen and Scheffman concluded: "[T]here is little credible statistical evi-
dence that would justify the Commission's assumptions which underlie the Antitrust
Guideline." Mark A. Cohen & David T. Scheffman, The Antitrust Sentencing Guideline: Is the
Punishment Worth the Costs?, 27 Am. CrIM. L. REV. 331, 333 (1989). "At least in price-fixing
cases involving a substantial volume of commerce, ten percent is almost certainly too high."
Id. at 343. During recent years similar criticisms often have been made. Not surprisingly,
those who have defended companies accused of collusion have asserted that the 10% pre-
sumption has led to penalties so large they caused overdeterrence. For example, Adler and
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In a recently published study, however, my co-author, Professor
John Connor, and I identified more than 200 serious economic stud-
ies of cartels that contained 674 observations of "average"
overcharges.64 Our primary finding is that the median overcharge for
all types of cartels has been 25%. This breaks down to 17-19% for
domestic cartels, and 30-33% for international cartels.65 The mean
66
overcharge for all types of cartels was even higher: 49%.67 Signifi-
cantly, 79% of the cartels charged, on the average, more than the 10%
figure used as the U.S. Sent. Comm'n's presumption, and 60%
overcharged by more than 20%.68 We did not find bid rigging conspir-
acies to be more harmful than price fixing, and we found no basis for
believing that cartels in larger markets overcharged less.
69
We also attempted to determine the sizes of cartel overcharges by
utilizing a very different data set. We studied every final verdict we
Laing concluded that "[t] he fines being imposed against corporate members of interna-
tional cartels are staggering." Howard Adler Jr. & David J. Laing, Explosion of International
Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, 11 CORP. COUNS. 1, 1 (1997). More recently, Crandall and
Winston, two researchers at the Brookings Institution, further argued: "We find little em-
pirical evidence that past [antitrust] interventions have provided much direct benefit to
consumers or significantly deterred anticompetitive behavior." Robert W. Crandall & Clif-
ford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2003). To support their view that cartels are ineffective and the prosecu-
tion of overt price fixing is unwise, they cited five empirical studies of overt collusion that
found that conspiracies convicted in United States courts had no upward effects on prices.
Id. at 14-15. Tefft W. Smith called for lowering the 10% presumption down "to 3 or 5%.
That may be (equally) arbitrary but probably more realistic, 'fair' and desirable from an
enforcement policy perspective." Criminal Antitrust Remedies: Hearing Before the Antitrust Mod-
ernization Comm'n 21 (2005), available at http://www.amc.gov/commissionhearings/pdf/
SmithStatement.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2006) (comments of Tefft W. Smith).
63. For a recent critique, see A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, COMMENTS OF THE ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW IN RESPONSE TO THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMIS-
SION'S REQUEST FOR PuBLIc COMMENT ON CRIMINAL REMEDIES (2005), available at http://
www.abanet.org/antitrust/comments/2005/11-05/criminal-remedies-comm.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 12, 2006) (filed at the Antitrust Modernization Commission).
The Section has questioned, and continues to question, whether the current pre-
sumption in determining criminal fine levels is empirically sound or good public
policy. Having reviewed the Sentencing Commission's analysis of the issue, the
Section concluded that the presumption that the "average gain from price-fixing
is 10 percent of the selling price" was unsupported by empirical economic
evidence.
Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted).
64. Connor & Lande, Optimal Cartel Fines, supra note 57, at 559.
65. Id. at 559.
66. The "mean" is the average of all of the overcharges. The "median" figure is
greater than half of the overcharges and less than half.
67. Connor & Lande, Optimal Cartel Fines, supra note 57, at 559.
68. Id,
69. Id.
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could find in United States collusion cases. 70 From these, we culled
those cases that reported enough information to enable us to com-
pute the percentage by which the cartel raised prices on average. 71
These results showed a similar pattern: an average median overcharge
of 22% and an average mean overcharge of 31%.72 Since our data
sample was small, however, we have not computed separate median or
mean figures for domestic or international cartels. 73
Thus, median or mean cartel overcharges are at least two or three
times as high as the level presumed by the U.S. Sent. Comm'n. Our
study shows that cartels actually cause more harm than was tradition-
ally realized, 74 and that the existing level of cartel fines will do little to
deter most cartels. 75 This research also suggests that existing cartel
penalties should be raised significantly because they do not ade-
quately reflect the actual amounts by which cartels typically raise
prices.
70. Id at 551-57.
71. Id at 555-60.
72. Id. at 560.
73. Id. at 560-61. We were only able to find twenty-five final cartel verdicts that con-
tained information from which an overcharge percentage could be computed. Of these,
twenty exceeded the U.S. Sent. Comm'n Guideline's presumption. Id.
74. Id. at 561. We are now only referring to higher prices. See also supra note 21, for
other harms caused by cartels. In addition, it might be true that, on occasion, firms learned
to cooperate while colluding. Thus, even after the explicit conspiracy ended, the prices
failed to return to competitive levels.
75. Connor & Lande, Optimal Cartel Fines, supra note 57, at 561-64. The continued
high number of Department of Justice ("DOJ") grand juries indicates, however, that a lot
of cartels still exist. As ofJanuary 2005, the DOJ had approximately 118 pending grand jury
investigations, fifty of which involved suspected international cartel activity. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., WoicLoAD STATISTICS: FY 1995-2004 (2005), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2005); Scott D. Hammond,
U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Antitrust Div., Status Report: An Overview of Recent Developments in
the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, Address Before the American Bar
Association Midwinter Leadership Meeting (Jan. 10, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Hammond
Overview]. The DOJ and a large number of grand juries clearly believe there are a lot of
cartels that still exist. Between 1995 and 2004, the DOJ opened from nineteen to forty-
eight grand jury investigations per year, most of which resulted in convictions. U.S. DEP'T
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V. Myth #5: Even Though Treble Damages Should Be
Maintained for Hardcore Violations, They Should Be
Reduced for Certain Violations, Such as Rule of
Reason Violations 76
It has often been proposed that damages should be detrebled for
rule of reason violations or that trebling for rule of reason violations
should be made discretionary. 77 Either regime, however, would lead
to less deterrence than currently exists, would be more complicated,
and, in light of the current uncertain line between per se and rule of
reason antitrust violations, would lead to less business certainty.
OF JUSTICE, supra. The following table shows the DOJ's success in prosecuting antitrust
violations:
Total
Criminal
Cases 1995 '96 '97 '98 '99 2000 '01 '02 '03 '04
Filed 60 42 38 62 57 63 44 33 41 42
Won 65 38 40 64 48 52 38 37 32 35
Lost 2 5 1 1 2 - 2 1 1 1
Pending - - - 17 24 35 39 34 42 48
Appeal
Decisions 7 6 4 6 - - 5 1 2 7
Id.
If there had been little or no effective price fixing during this period, the DOJ has
been fooling a lot of grand juries, judges, and juries. During the last five years, over 100
years of imprisonment have been imposed on antitrust offenders, with more than forty
defendants receiving jail sentences of one year or longer. Hammond Overview, supra at 3.
In 2005, defendants in cases prosecuted by the Antitrust Division were sentenced to a re-
cord number of jail days, more than 13,000 days in all. Scott D. Hammond, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Div., An Update of the Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Pro-
gram, Address Before the A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law Cartel Enforcement Roundtable
1 (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/213247.htm (last visited
Jan. 12, 2006). In 2003, the average jail sentence reached a record high of twenty-one
months. Hammond Overview, supra, at 3.
76. This myth could be characterized as a policy conclusion that follows from the
previous myths.
77. For citations and a discussion of ten detrebling options, see generally Edward D.
Cavanaugh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REv. 777
(1987) ("In 1983, then Assistant Attorney General William Baxter proposed that damages
be detrebled in cases governed by the rule of reason but that trebling be retained in per se
cases." Id. at 825. (citing William F. Baxter, Research Joint Ventures: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong. 154, 159 (1983) (testimony of William F.
Baxter))). See also Civil Remedies Issues: Hearing Before the Antitrust Modernization Comm'n
10-14 (2005) (statement of Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr.). Some of the discussion in this Section is
based upon Lande, Damage Levels, supra note 27, at 343-44.
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Moreover, rule of reason violations, like cartels, cause harms in
addition to the higher prices that they force consumers to pay-they
also are likely to cause allocative inefficiency and umbrella effects.
Their victims similarly cannot receive prejudgment interest' 8 Thus,
the "treble" damages awarded for rule of reason violations probably
amount to roughly only single damages.
Yet, a multiplier of greater than one is still appropriate for rule of
reason situations. 79 The multiplier of three is used, at least in part,
because antitrust violations frequently are hard to detect and to prove
to be anticompetitive.80 Rule of reason cases on average are easier to
detect, but they are much harder to prove than per se cases.81 There is
no reason why the same overall multiplier should not be used for both
rule of reason and per se violations. 82
78. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., dis-
senting). Moreover, as Averitt & Lande, supra note 21, indicate, antitrust violations also can
lead to lower short term consumer choice and lower long term rates of innovation. These
can, at times, be more harmful to consumer welfare than the price effects of anticompeti-
tive behavior. These factors suggest that cartel penalties should be further increased.
Injunctive relief can also be more important than monetary recoveries by consumers.
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. 396 F. 3d 96, 111 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The settle-
ment includes $3,383,400,000 in compensatory relief, plus additional injunctive relief val-
ued at $25 to $87 billion or more.").
79. As noted earlier, Judge Easterbrook observed:
Multiplication is essential to create optimal incentives for would-be violators when
unlawful acts are not certain to be prosecuted successfully. Indeed, some multipli-
cation is necessary even when most of the liability-creating acts are open and no-
torious. The defendants may be able to conceal facts that are essential to liability.
Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 454.
80. Professor Cavanaugh points out:
Arguably, trebling is too low for concealable offenses such as price-fixing, and too
high for unconcealed acts which may be illegal, such as tying and certain merger
activity. However, this theoretical approach falters when one attempts to translate
it into a legal rule. It would be impractical, if not impossible, to compute the
likelihood of detection and hence the proper multiple for each industry for each
antitrust violation. Here, trebling provides not only rough justice but also a pre-
dictable, workable rule of law.
See Cavanaugh Statement, supra note 42, at 5-6.
81. See Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 (1982)
("Treble damages make the remedy meaningful by counter-balancing the difficulty of
maintaining a private suit under the antitrust laws." (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted)).
82. Professor Cavanaugh eloquently and persuasively argues that those favoring a
change should have the burden of persuasion: "[F]rom a process perspective, mandatory
trebling comes before the AMC with a 115 year history. That history creates a strong pre-
sumption in favor of mandatory trebling. Accordingly, opponents of mandatory trebling
have a heavy burden to overcome. To date, that burden has not been met." Cavanaugh
Statement, supra note 42, at 11.
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It is even possible that "treble" damages are more important in
rule of reason cases. "Treble" damages were probably adopted, in
part, to provide an incentive for private litigants to find and prove
violations. Rule of reason cases are tremendously risky, protracted,
and expensive. Abolishing "treble" damages in rule of reason cases
could effectively decimate rule of reason private antitrust enforce-
ment. The number of rule of reason actions could decrease tremen-
dously, eventually resulting in a substantial number of additional rule
of reason violations.
Letting judges decide whether damages will be trebled at the end
of trial would impact significantly upon the incentives of law firms to
undertake rule of reason cases on a contingency basis. As the risk/
reward ratio becomes more uncertain 83 and decreases dramatically,
the number of plaintiffs with legitimate complaints who cannot secure
effective legal representation will increase. 84 Professors Salop and
White showed that making trebling discretionary would increase un-
certainty for both plaintiffs and defendants, which is undesirable for a
number of reasons,85 including its likelihood of leading to lower set-
83. As Professor Cavanaugh observes:
At least in the short run, differing standards may emerge in the lower courts as to
when trebling is appropriate. Eventually, the Supreme Court would probably step
in to provide a uniform standard; but in the meantime, at least some forum shop-
ping would likely occur. This creates the spectre of federal "magnet courts" and
may exacerbate rather than alleviate problems of unfairness. Differing standards
for imposing multiple damages also would create uncertainty regarding settle-
ment. When one is not sure whether single or treble damages will be imposed, it
becomes difficult to evaluate in any meaningful way possible financial risks or
gains.
Id at 10.
84. In some respects the pre-case calculations of plaintiffs' attorneys can be compared
to those of venture capitalists. For each case they consider filing, they make their best guess
as to their chances of success, the time the case will require until victory, and the expected
recovery. If the expected recovery is decreased by two thirds, they will be much less likely to
bring the case.
85. Professors Salop and White explain:
A discretionary damages multiple . . . increase[s] uncertainty. Uncertainty also
might be increased during transitional periods culminating in a new legal
standard....
Uncertainty affects the plaintiffs willingness to initiate suit, the defendant's will-
ingness to engage in potentially illegal behavior, and the ability of the parties to
reach a settlement .... Greater uncertainty over the outcome at trial may make
the defendant either more or less aggressive in his business conduct .... There-
fore, the defendant will have less incentive to avoid violations at the margin when
his choice of conduct has little effect on the likely outcome. This result occurs
because a lower overall likelihood of liability reduces the effect of changes in
business conduct on the likelihood of liability. Uncertainty also affects the incen-
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dement rates.8 6 Either mandatory or discretionary detrebling also
would decrease the "accuracy" of antitrust outcomes because parties
tend to devote more effort when the stakes are higher.8 7
These problems would be especially acute because criminal pen-
alties are irrelevant in rule of reason cases. The private payouts must
supply the full measure of optimal deterrence. In many per se cases,
by contrast, some of the optimal deterrence will be supplied by crimi-
nal penalties.
Moreover, "treble" damages force companies to be more aware of
the possible antitrust consequences of their actions, leading to fewer
violations. Even though "treble" damages, when examined properly,
are really single damages, if a company believes they might encounter
treble damages payouts, they may be deterred from engaging in an-
ticompetitive conduct. On the other hand, single damages combined
with an unknown and uncertain, but significantly less than 100%
tives for potential plaintiffs to sue. To the extent that the potential plaintiff is risk
averse, uncertainty reduces his incentive to sue by increasing the overall variance
of the returns from this strategy.
Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO.
LJ. 1001, 1022-23 (1986).
86. Settlements are less likely when the parties have differing expectations about the
expected value of the outcome. Id. at 1024-26. If trebling were made discretionary this
would cause these expectations to diverge. Id. "Perloff and Rubinfeld tried to estimate the
effect of detrebling on the settlement rate. Although their results are quite preliminary
and by no means certain, they do predict a reduction in the overall settlement rate from
detrebling." Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Treble Damages Reform: Implications of the
Georgetown Project, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 90 (1986) [hereinafter Salop & White, Georgetown
Project].
87. Salop & White, Georgetown Project, supra note 86, at 89.
In the absence of the financial incentives from treble damages, plaintiffs may find
it uneconomical to plead theories requiring hard evidence. Instead, they are
more likely to argue for simplified standards that are less expensive to litigate.
And courts are likely to permit abbreviated standards and proof in order to main-
tain fairness. This leads to a potential conflict between detrebling and sophisti-
cated rule of reason analysis. This is related to the issue of the proper liability
standard as well. If it is too expensive, in the absence of the financial incentives
provided by a damages multiple, for a plaintiff to prove injury to competition, the
courts may be overly willing to infer injury to competition from proof of injury to
the competitor. We think this would be a step in the wrong direction .... First,
increasing the damages multiple gives the parties an incentive to increase litiga-
tion costs because more is at stake.., to the extent that greater litigation effort
reduces the rate of incorrect assignment of liability, then this represents a social
benefit, though not necessarily equal to the higher costs.
Id. at 89-90 (emphasis in original).
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probability of detection and litigation, provide strong incentives to vi-
olate the law.88
Conclusion
If the AMC decides to recommend any changes in this area, it
should not recommend that damage levels be lowered or be made
discretionary for certain types of antitrust cases, such as rule of reason
offenses. Instead, it should recommend that damage levels be raised
so that they are at the real three-fold level for all types of antitrust
cases. As an important move towards this goal the AMC should recom-
mend that prevailing plaintiffs should automatically receive prejudg-
ment interest, starting when the antitrust damages first occur.
Moreover, firms that are caught and convicted of price fixing often
earn a profit despite the existing array of antitrust damages and penal-
ties. For hardcore offenses we are so far from the overdeterrence
point that a substantial increase in damages and penalties is war-
ranted. The existing levels of criminal penalties should be raised
substantially.
88. Nor would criminal sanctions be a deterrent because they are not usually imposed
in rule of reason cases. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 593-94.
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